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Rationality and Power 
That human beings have the potential for rationality and the ability to 
cultivate it is a fact of human nature. But to value rationality and its 
subsidiary character dispositions - impartiality, intellectual discrimination, 
foresight, deliberation, prudence, self-reflection, self-control - is another 
matter entirely. According to Nietzsche, this fact of human nature becomes a 
value when it is valorized by a "slave morality" that assigns highest priority to 
the character dispositions of rationality and the spirit at the expense of natural 
human instincts. Like a good Untertan, I intend to do exactly that in this 
project. I am going to take it as a given that if a person's freedom to act on her 
impulses and gratify her desires is constrained by the existence of others' 
equal, or more powerful, conflicting impulses and desires, then she will need 
the character dispositions of rationality to survive. The more circumscribed 
one's freedom and power, the more essential to survival and flourishing the 
character dispositions of rationality and the spirit may become. 
And I am going to presuppose as well that if such a person's power to 
achieve her ends is limited by a distribution of scarce social or material 
resources often less than fair or favorable to herself, then she may well find 
the character dispositions of rationality and the spirit to be a needed source of 
strength and solace. On these assumptions, the valorization of the character 
dispositions of rationality and the spirit that typify a "slave morality" does not 
express mere sour grapes, as Nietzsche sometimes suggests in his more 
contemptuous moments. Nor does it merely make a virtue of necessity, 
although it does at least do that. It expresses the recognition of an intrinsic 
good whose value may be less evident to those for whom it is less necessary 
as an instrument of survival: 
How long will you wait to think yourself worthy of the highest and 
transgress in nothing the clear pronouncement of reason?... Therefore 
resolve before it is too late to live as one who is mature and proficient, 
and let all that seems best to you be a law that you cannot transgress… 
This was how Socrates attained perfection, attending to nothing but 
reason in all that he encountered. And if you are not yet Socrates, yet you 
ought to live as one who would wish to be a Socrates.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Epictetus, Enchiridion LI. I have consulted two translations: P. E. Matheson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), reprinted in Jason L. Saunders (ed.) Greek and Roman Philosophy after 
Aristotle (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 147, and George Long (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery, 1956), pp. 202-3. 
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Think of these injunctions as conjointly constitutive of the Socratic ideal. As 
the product of biographical fact, Epictetus' loyalty to the Socratic ideal - and 
in particular his injunctions to "transgress in nothing the clear pronouncement 
of reason," and to "atten[d] to nothing but reason in all that [we] encounte[r]" 
are an expression of wisdom born of the personal experience of enslavement. 
They attest to the valuation and cultivation of rationality as the weapon of 
choice for the unempowered to use on their own behalf. They both 
underwrite Nietzsche's analysis of reason and the spirit as central values of a 
"slave morality," and demonstrate how that "slave morality" may have a kind 
of dignity that übermenschlichen views lack. 
For if a person's freedom and power to act on his impulses is greater, 
then he may well find the indulgence of emotion, spontaneity, instinct, and 
the manipulation of power more attractive; and development of the character 
dispositions of rationality correspondingly less necessary, interesting, or 
valuable. After all, such individuals have at hand other reserves - of wealth, 
status, influence and coercion - on which to draw to achieve their ends. The 
ends which the character dispositions of rationality and the spirit may 
themselves inspire therefore may be accorded correspondingly less 
importance, if they are noticed in the first place. For such individuals, the 
Socratic ideal is no ideal at all. 
Philosophy as an intellectual discipline is fundamentally defined and 
distinguished from other intellectual disciplines by its loyalty to the character 
dispositions of rationality, and so to the Socratic ideal. Anglo-American 
analytic philosophy is committed to these values with a particularly high 
degree of self-consciousness. Whatever the content of the philosophical view 
in question, the norms of theoretical rationality define its standards of 
philosophical exposition: clarity, structure, coherence, consistency, fineness of 
intellectual discrimination. And as a professional and pedagogical practice, 
philosophy is ideally defined by its adherence to the norms of rational 
discourse and criticism. In philosophy the appeal is to the other's rationality, 
with the purpose of convincing her of the veracity of one's own point of view. 
It is presumed that this purpose has been achieved if the other's subsequent 
behavior changes accordingly. 
This presumption is fueled by philosophy's unsupervised influence in the 
political sphere - of Rousseau on the French Revolution, Locke on the 
American Revolution, Marx on Communism, Nietzsche on the Second World 
War, Rawls's Difference Principle on Reaganomics. In the private and social 
sphere, rational analysis and dialogue may just as easily give way to 
unsupervised imbalances in power and freedom, paternalistic or coercive 
relationships, or exploitative transactions. But even here philosophy may 
have its influence: in turning another aside from an unethical or imprudent 
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course of action, or requiring him to revise his views in light of certain 
objections, or altering his attitudes toward oneself, or influencing others to 
accommodate the importance of certain philosophical considerations through 
compromise, tolerance, or mutual agreement. 
In both spheres, then, the attempt rationally to persuade and to conduct 
oneself rationally toward others is an expression of respect, not only for their 
rationality, but thereby for the alternative resources of power - coercion, 
bribery, retaliation, influence - they are perceived as free to use in its stead. 
Toward one who is perceived to lack these alternative resources, no such 
respect need be shown, and raw power may be displayed and exercised more 
freely. For, as Hobbes reminds us, 
[h]onourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument 
or sign of power… And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of 
many, is honourable; as arguments of power… To speak to another with 
consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to 
honour him; as signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do any 
thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonour.
2
 
Hobbes is wrong to think that treating another with respect is nothing 
but an expression of fear of the other's power. But he is surely right to think 
that it is at least that. On Nietzsche's refinement of Hobbes's analysis, the 
appeal to reason expresses respect for another's rational autonomy to just and 
only that extent to which it simultaneously expresses fear of the alternative, 
nonrational ways in which that autonomy may be exercised. On Nietzsche's 
analysis of rational conduct, Hobbes and Kant may both be right. 
So philosophy's traditional commitment to the Socratic ideal is one 
quintessential expression of a "slave morality" that acknowledges the danger 
of unrestrained instinct and the use of power in its service; by varying 
degrees it constrains and sublimates instinct, impulse, and the manipulation 
of power into a rational exercise of intellect and will that brings its own 
fulfillments: 
The ignorant man's position and character is this: he never looks to 
himself for benefit or harm, but to the world outside him. The 
philosopher's position and character is that he always looks to himself for 
benefit and harm. The signs of one who is making progress are: he 
blames none, praises none, complains of none, accuses none, never 
speaks of himself as if he were somebody, or as if he knew anything. 
When he is hindered, he blames himself… He has got rid of desire, and 
his aversion is directed no longer to what is beyond our power [i.e. the 
                                                 
2
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier, 1977), pp. 75, 
74. 
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body, property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not 
our own doing] but only to what is in our power [i.e. thought, impulse, 
desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing] and 
contrary to nature. In all things he exercises his will temperately.
3
 
The philosopher, according to Epictetus, foregoes the gratification of desire 
and acquisition of external goods and power for the sake of cultivating the 
character dispositions of rationality. Seeing that these two alternative 
frequently conflict, she "atten[ds] to nothing but reason in all that [she] 
encounter[s]." The centrality and universality of the character dispositions of 
rationality to the discipline of philosophy, enduring over eighteen centuries, 
may explain why almost all philosophers, regardless of their express 
philosophical views on the value of rationality, try to muster the resources of 
rational argumentation, analysis, and criticism to defend those views. The 
consistency and sincerity with which they try to live up to the Socratic ideal 
bespeaks the seriousness of their intent to avoid the dormant alternatives. 
 
Rationality as Philosophical Virtue 
The priority accorded to the character dispositions of rationality in the 
practice of philosophy receives a more contemporary formulation in the 
following Anglo-American analytic version of the Socratic ideal:
4
 
[G. E.] Moore … invented and propagated a style of philosophical 
talking which has become one of the most useful and attractive models of 
rationality that we have, and which is still a prop to liberal values, having 
penetrated far beyond philosophical circles and far beyond Bloomsbury 
circles; it is also a source of continuing enjoyment, once one has acquired 
the habit among friends who have a passion for slow argument on both 
abstract and personal topics. When I look back to the Thirties and call on 
memories, it even seems that Moore invented a new moral virtue, a 
virtue of high civilization admittedly, which has its ancestor in Socrates' 
famous following of an argument wherever it may lead, but still with a 
quite distinctive modern and Moorean accent. Open-mindedness in 
discussion is to be associated with extreme literal clarity, with no rhetoric 
                                                 
3
 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. xlviii, note 1; see also ch. I. 
4
 The following discussion of Anglo-American philosophical practice has benefited 
from comments by Anita Allen, Houston Baker, Paul Boghossian, Ann Congleton, Ruth 
Anna Putnam and Kenneth Winkler, as well as by members of the audience at the 1994 
Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium symposium, "Philosophy as 
Performance" at which these remarks were originally presented. 
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and the least possible use of metaphor, with an avoidance of technical 
terms wherever possible, and with extreme patience in step-by-step 
unfolding of the reasons that support any assertion made, together with 
all the qualifications that need to be added to preserve literal truth, 
however commonplace and disappointing the outcome. It is a style and a 
discipline that wring philosophical insights from the English language, 
pressed hard and repeatedly; as far as I know, the style has no 
counterpart in French or German. As Nietzsche suggested, cultivated 
caution and modesty in assertion are incompatible with the bold egotism 
of most German philosophy after Kant. This style of talking, particularly 
when applied to emotionally charged personal issues, was a gift to the 
world, not only to Bloomsbury, and it is still useful a long way from 
Cambridge.
5
 
The writer is Stuart Hampshire, and in this passage he describes as an 
historical fact a more recent ideal of philosophical practice, which speaks to 
some of the motives and impulses that attract many into the field. The essence 
of the ideal remains Socratic: clarity and truth as a goal, with patience, 
persistence, precision, and a nonjudgmental openness to discussion and 
contention as the means. 
Hampshire is right to describe this ideal as a "new moral virtue… of high 
civilization." It is a moral virtue because it imposes on one the obligation to 
subordinate the egocentric desires to prevail in argument, to shine in 
conversation, or to one-up one's opponent to the disinterested ethical 
requirements of impartiality, objectivity, and rationality in discussion. And it 
is a virtue of high civilization because it is not possible to achieve this virtue - 
or even to recognize it as a virtue - without already having cultivated and 
brought to fruition certain civilized dispositions of character, tastes, and 
values that override the desire to prevail. Thus this moral virtue stands at the 
very center of a "slave morality" that sublimates the desire to prevail to the 
imperatives of reason and the spirit. These imperatives, in turn, find 
expression in what Mill calls the higher pleasures of the intellect and moral 
and aesthetic sensibility. They presuppose the victory of "slave morality" in 
subjugating instinct and the exercise of power to the rule of reason and its 
attendant ethical values of fairness and impartiality in thought and action. 
This virtue of high civilization, then, presupposes both its participants' 
rationality and also their achievement of an equitable balance of power - 
however the material and social instruments of power may be distributed. 
                                                 
5
 Stuart Hampshire, "Liberator, Up to a Point," New York Review of Books XXXIV/5 
(March 26, 1987), pp. 37-9. 
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Thus this ideal can have meaning only for someone for whom basic 
psychological and spiritual needs for self-worth, and moral needs for the 
affirmation of self-rectitude are not so pressing that every dialectical 
encounter with others - whether written or conversational - is mined for its 
potential to satisfy them. So when we say of such a person that he is civilized, 
we may mean, among other things, that in conversation he is disposed to be 
generous in according credibility to his opponent's view, gracious in 
acknowledging its significance, patient in drawing forth its implications, and 
graceful in accepting its criticism of his own. Someone who has mastered this 
new moral virtue of high civilization is someone for whom philosophical 
practice expresses an ideal of personal civility, a civility made possible only by 
the control and sublimation of instinct, impulse, desire, and emotion. 
The higher pleasure of doing philosophy in the style Hampshire 
describes is then the disinterested pleasure of thinking, considering, learning, 
and knowing as ends in themselves, and of giving these pleasures to and 
receiving them from others involved in the same enterprise, in acts of 
communication. Plato was surely right to suggest that we are driven to seek 
erotic pleasure from others by the futile desire to merge, to become one with 
them. Erotic desire is ultimately futile for reasons of simple physics: we are 
each stuck in our own physical bodies, and you cannot achieve the desired 
unity by knocking two separate physical entities together, no matter how 
closely and repeatedly, and no matter how much fun it is to do the knocking. 
Intellectual unity with another is a different matter altogether, however, 
and the kind Hampshire describes is particularly satisfying because it does 
not require either partner to submerge or abnegate herself in the will or 
convictions of the other. It does not require sharing the same opinions, or 
suppressing one's own worldview, or deferring or genuflecting to the other in 
order to achieve agreement. Rather, the enterprise is a collaborative one 
between equals who pool their philosophical resources. By contributing 
questions, amendments, refinements, criticisms, objections, examples, 
counterexamples, or elaborations in response to the other's philosophical 
assertions, we each extend and enrich both of our philosophical imaginations 
past their individual limits and into the other's domain. There are few 
intellectual pleasures more intense than the Aha-Erlebnis of finally 
understanding, after long and careful dialogue, what another person actually 
means - unless it is that of being understood oneself in that way. 
The ground rules for succeeding in this enterprise are ethical ones. By 
making such assertions as clearly as I can, I extend to you an invitation to 
intellectual engagement; and I express trust, vulnerability and respect for 
your opinion in performing that act. I thereby challenge you to exercise your 
trained philosophical character dispositions - for impartiality, objectivity, and 
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rationality - in examining my assertions; and to demonstrate your mastery of 
the enterprise in the act of engaging in it. This is the challenge to perform, in 
the practice of dialogue and conversation, at the ethical level made possible 
by our basic human capacities for language, logic and abstraction; and to 
bring those capacities themselves under the purview and guidance of our 
conception of right conduct. By engaging in the enterprise of philosophical 
dialogue, we challenge each other to observe the ethical and intellectual 
obligations of philosophical practice. 
In this enterprise, I have failed if you feel crestfallen at having to concede 
a point, rather than inspired to elaborate upon it; or ashamed at having 
missed a point, rather than driven to persist in untangling it; or self-important 
for having made a point, rather than keen to test its soundness. After all, the 
goal of the enterprise is to inspire both of us with the force of the ideas we are 
examining, not to make either of us feel unequal to considering them, or smug 
for having introduced them. Too often we conceive of moral virtue as having 
to do only with such things as helping the needy, keeping promises, or 
loyalty in friendship - as though performing well in these areas relieved us of 
the obligation to refrain from making another person feel stupid, ashamed or 
crazy for voicing her thoughts; or ourselves feel superior for undermining 
them. When teachers fail to impart a love of philosophy to their 
undergraduate students, or drive graduate students, traumatized, out of their 
classes and out of the field, it is often because these elemental guidelines for 
conducting the enterprise - guidelines that express the simple truth that a love 
of philosophy is incompatible with feeling humiliated or trounced or arrogant 
or self-congratulatory for one's contributions to it - have been ignored. So this 
enterprise presupposes a basic and reciprocal respect for the minds, ideas and 
words of one's discussants, a respect that is expressed in attention to and 
interest in what they have to say. 
Kant's concept of Achtung captures the intellectual attitude involved in 
this moral virtue of high civilization. The term is usually translated, in Kant's 
writings, as "respect"; and the object of Achtung is usually assumed to be 
exclusively the moral law. But Kant's account of reason in the first Critique 
makes quite clear that the moral law is not separate from the workings of 
theoretical reason more generally, but rather an application of it to the special 
case of first-personal action. We feel Achtung toward all the ways in which 
reason regulates our activity, both mental and physical. Moreover, in the 
Groundwork Kant makes it equally clear that he is not diverging from an 
important common, vernacular meaning of the term, which is closer to 
something like "respectful attention." When you and I are trying to get clear 
about the implications of a statement one of us has made - when we are fully 
engaged in the activity of "wring[ing] philosophical insights from the English 
language, pressed hard and repeatedly" - Achtung is what we feel for the 
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intellectual process in which we are engaged and the insights we thereby 
bring forth. 
And when Kant says that Achtung "impairs [Abbruch tut] self-love," he 
does not mean that Achtung crushes our egos or makes us feel ashamed of 
being the self-absorbed worms we know we are. He means, rather, that the 
value, significance, and power of the thing that compels our attention 
compels it so completely that we momentarily forget the constantly clamoring 
needs, demands and absorptions of the self; the object of our respectful 
attention overwhelms and silences them. For that moment we are mutually 
absorbed in the object of contemplation, or in actively responding to it - by 
acting, or by articulating it, or by evaluating its implications, or by 
reformulating or defending it - rather than trying to mine the discussion for 
transient satisfactions of our psychological cravings for self-aggrandizement. 
Achtung is an active, conative response to an abstract idea that overrides and 
outcompetes our subjective psychological needs as an object worthy of our 
attention. 
These are the rare moments of intellectual self-transcendence in 
which together, through "extreme literal clarity, with no rhetoric and 
the least possible use of metaphor, with an avoidance of technical 
terms wherever possible, and with extreme patience in the step-by- 
step unfolding of the reasons that support any assertion made, 
together with all the qualifications that need to be added to preserve 
literal truth," we succeed in fashioning an idiolect subtle and flexible 
enough to satisfy and encompass all of the linguistic nuances we each 
bring to the project of verbally communicating our thoughts to each other. It 
is then that we achieve the only genuine unity with another 
of which we are capable. Alcibiades' drunken and complaining encomium to 
Socrates was also a eulogy to his own transient victory in 
achieving - even momentarily - the intellectual self-transcendence Socrates 
demanded. 
 
Power and Philosophical Practice 
Now I said that Hampshire described this Anglo-American update on the 
Socratic ideal as itself a historical fact. But is it? Here is a competing 
description of the same historical circumstance, from a rather different 
perspective: 
Victory was with those who could speak with the greatest appearance of 
clear, undoubting conviction and could best use the accents of 
infallibility. Moore… was a great master of this method - greeting one's 
remarks with a gasp of incredulity - Do you really think that, an 
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expression of face as if to hear such a thing said reduced him to a state of 
wonder verging on imbecility, with his mouth wide open and wagging 
his head in the negative so violently that his hair shook. "Oh!" he would 
say, goggling at you as if either you or he must be mad; and no reply was 
possible. Strachey's methods were different; grim silence as if such a 
dreadful observation was beyond comment and the less said about it the 
better… [Woolf] was better at producing the effect that it was useless to 
argue with him than at crushing you… In practice it was a kind of combat 
in which strength of character was really much more valuable than 
subtlety of mind.
6
 
Here the writer is John Maynard Keynes. Where Hampshire saw the character 
dispositions of rationality in full flourishing, Keynes sees psychological and 
emotional intimidation. Where Hampshire saw the flowering of a moral 
virtue of high civilization - the flowering, in Nietzsche's terms, of "slave 
morality," Keynes sees little more than a less-than-subtle power struggle 
among Übermenschen, driven by the instinct to win social status, even at the 
cost of philosophical integrity. Who saw more clearly? The answer is 
important for calling into question whether the character dispositions of 
rationality are as central to philosophical practice as they are purported to be; 
and so, more generally, whether the character dispositions of rationality can 
be as central to the structure of the self as I, in this project, argue they are. 
There can be little doubt that Hampshire's version of the Socratic ideal of 
philosophical dialogue requires of us a standard of intellectual and moral 
conduct to which most of us are, most of the time, intellectually and morally 
inadequate; and so that the ideal of rationality so valorized by a "slave 
morality" may be - for us - little more than that. Here the moral inadequacy 
exacerbates the intellectual inadequacy. It is difficult enough to keep in mind 
at one time more than a few steps in an extended and complex philosophical 
argument, or fully appreciate the two opposing views that must be reconciled, 
or grasp the point of your opponent's criticism as he is voicing it while you 
are mentally both formulating your refutation of it and refining your view so 
as to accommodate it. But these purely intellectual limitations are made so 
much worse by what Kant calls "certain impulsions" of "the dear self" that 
obscure or interfere with the clarity and sure-footedness of the reasoning 
process: the need to be right or amusing at another's expense, the need to 
prove one's intelligence, the need to triumph, or to secure one's authority, or 
to prove one's superiority, or mark one's territory; or more viciously, the need 
                                                 
6
 John Maynard Keynes, "My Early Beliefs," in Two Memoirs (New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1949), pp. 85, 88, quoted in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 121. 
The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 10 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
to intimidate one's opponent, to attack and crush her, shut her up, express 
one's contempt for her, exact revenge, teach her a lesson, or force her out of 
the dialogue. All of these needs exist on an ethical continuum, from the 
merely regrettable or pathetic at one end to the brutal or sadistic at the other. 
The essence of our moral inadequacy to Hampshire's Socratic ideal of 
philosophical conduct is our temptation to use even the limited skills of 
philosophical dialogue we have as a tool of self-aggrandizement or a weapon 
to bludgeon our opponent, rather than to arrive at recognizable truths we can 
both embrace. 
This temptation finds vivid expression in certain familiar philosophical 
styles most of us have encountered at one time or another. For example, we 
have all at some point surely met - or been - the Bulldozer. The Bulldozer talks 
at you, at very great length, rather than to you; and seems to understand by 
"philosophical dialogue" what most people understand by "lecture." Indeed, 
Bulldozers may make excellent lecturers, and lecturing is an excellent training 
ground for bulldozing. The Bulldozer expounds at length his view, its 
historical antecedents, and its implications; anticipates your objections to it, 
enumerates each one, complete with examples, and refutes them; explains the 
views of his opponents and critiques them; and no doubt does much, much 
more than this, long after you have excused yourself and backed away with a 
muttered apology about needing to make a phone call. Sometimes the 
Bulldozer seems almost to induce in himself a trance state by the sound of his 
own words, and seems impervious to your ineffectual attempts to get a word 
in edgewise. And should you momentarily succeed in getting a word in 
edgewise, rest assured that there will not be many of those. For any one of 
them may set off a further volcanic eruption of speech in the Bulldozer, a 
shower of philosophical associations that must be pursued at that moment 
and to the fullest extent, relentlessly, wherever they may lead. 
There is something alarmingly aimless and indiscriminate behind the 
compulsiveness of this performance, as though it were a Senate filibuster 
without a motion on the floor; as though the Bulldozer's greatest defeat 
would be to cede even the tiniest corner of verbal territory to someone else. Of 
course the experience of "conversing with" a Bulldozer is extremely irritating 
and oppressive, since one is being continually stymied in one's efforts to join 
the issues under scrutiny and make intellectual contact with one's discussant. 
But I think it is not difficult for any of us to imagine how it feels to be a 
Bulldozer, to feel driven to surround oneself stereophonically with the 
ongoing verbal demonstration of one's knowledge; to blanket every single 
square inch of the conceptual terrain, up to the horizon and beyond, with 
one's view of things; to fend off alien doubts, questions, and interjections of 
data into one's conceptual system by erecting around oneself a permanent 
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screen of words and sounds so dense and wide that nothing and no one can 
penetrate it. Of course the Bulldozer himself may not think he is thwarting 
philosophical contact with others but instead enabling it; and may believe, 
even more tragically, that if he just says enough, he will surely command 
agreement in the end. 
Then there is the Bully. Whereas the Bulldozer performs primarily for the 
sake of self-defense, the Bully performs more aggressively, in order to compel 
others' silent acquiescence. She may deploy familiar locutions designed to 
forestall objections or questions before they are raised: "Surely it is obvious 
that…" or "It is perfectly clear that…" or "Well, I take it that…" The message 
here is that anyone who would display such ignorance and lack of insight as 
to call these self-evident truths into question is too philosophically challenged 
to be taken seriously; and the intended effect is to intimidate the misguided 
into silence. 
For example, I resorted to some of these bullying techniques earlier, in 
my discussion of Kant. "Kant's account of reason in the first Critique MAKES 
QUITE CLEAR that the moral law is not separate from the workings of 
theoretical reason more generally," I claimed; and "in the Groundwork Kant 
MAKES IT EQUALLY CLEAR that he is not diverging from an important 
common, vernacular meaning of the term Achtung." In both of these cases, I 
tried to double the barrage of intimidation, by brazenly combining claims of 
self-evidence with an appeal to authority. Why? Because even though I know 
these views to be controversial, I wanted you to swallow them on faith, for 
the moment, without questioning me, so I could go on and build on those 
assumptions the further points I wanted to make. Elsewhere
7
 I do argue that a 
careful and unbiased look at the texts will support them. But I did not want to 
have to defend them here, or allow this General Introduction to the Project to 
turn into an exercise in Kant exegesis. So instead I finessed them through an 
attempt at intimidation; by insinuating, in effect, that ANYONE WHO'D 
TAKEN THE TIME TO STUDY THE TEXTS CAREFULLY could not fail to 
agree with my interpretation; and that any dissent from it would reveal only 
the dissenter's own scholarly turpitude. This is not philosophy. This is verbal 
harassment. 
This kind of bullying may have many causes. It may result from a 
deficiency of "extreme patience in step-by-step unfolding of the reasons that 
support any assertion made." For Hampshire does not notice that this moral 
virtue of high civilization may be best suited to a mild, placid, even 
phlegmatic temperament, and may be largely unattainable for those of us 
who tend toward excitability, irritability, or an impatient desire to cut to the 
                                                 
7
 Kant's Metaethics, in progress. 
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chase. But this does not excuse the indulgence of these tendencies at another's 
expense. After all, part of the point of philosophical training is to learn, not 
merely a prescribed set of texts and skills of reasoning, but also the discipline 
of philosophy. We are required to discipline our dispositions of attitude and 
motivation as well as of mind in its service. This is no more and no less than 
cultivation of the character dispositions of rationality requires. 
Philosophical bullying may also result from a negligence encouraged by 
the structural demands of professionalism. Excelling in any of the various 
branches of philosophy demands specialization. This may lead us to 
underestimate the importance of securely grounding with "step-by-step 
unfolding of the reasons that support" those parts of our views that lead us 
into other philosophical subspecialties - as, for example, political philosophy 
may lead into philosophy of social science, logic may lead into philosophy of 
language, epistemology may lead into philosophy of science, metaethics may 
lead into philosophical psychology, or any of these may lead into metaphysics 
or the history of philosophy. And since the scarcity of jobs and limited 
professional resources often places us in a competitive rather than a 
collaborative relationship with our colleagues in other subspecialties, we may 
be tempted, on occasion, simply to ignore, dismiss, or bully our way out of 
the kind of careful attention to foundations that Hampshire recommends. 
Furthermore, most of us entered this field because we needed to make a 
living doing something (true Untertanen that we are), and enjoyed doing 
philosophy enough to want to make a living doing it. As with any job on 
which our economic survival depends, we often have to balance the quality of 
our output against the time or space we have in which to do it. We are here to 
ply our trade, to speak authoritatively to the designated issues. And if what 
we have to say depends on unfounded or insufficiently argued assumptions, 
then (at least for the time being) so much the worse for those assumptions, 
and for those innocents who, not understanding the rules of the game - the 
allotted speaker time, the maximum acceptable article length, or the limited 
market demand for fat, ponderous books such as this one - would attempt to 
exercise quality control by calling those assumptions into question. 
The Bully becomes a morally objectionable Überbully with the choice of 
more insulting or hurtful terms of evaluation, and with the shouting, 
stamping of feet, or even throwing of objects that sometimes accompanies his 
attempts to drive home a point. This performance shades into unadorned 
wrongdoing when these tactics of verbal include insinuated threats of 
professional retaliation or clear verbal abuse. Suggestions that holding a 
certain philosophical position is not conducive to tenure or reappointment, or 
that one will he dropped from a project for challenging received wisdom, or 
that raising objections to a senior colleague's view is offensive and 
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inappropriate; as well as familiar locutions such as "Any idiot can see that…;" 
or, "That is the most ridiculous argument I've ever heard;" or, "What a deeply 
uninteresting claim;" or, "How can anyone be so dense as to believe that…?" 
are all among the Überbully's arsenal of verbal ammunition. Philosophers 
have been publicly and professionally humiliated for having argued a view 
that, in their critic's eyes, marked them as dim-witted, ill-read, poorly 
educated, lazy, devious, evasive, superficial, dull, ridiculous, dishonest, 
manipulative, or any combination of the above. Whereas the Bulldozer 
prevents you from contributing to the dialogue, the Überbully uses you and 
your philosophical contributions as a punching bag, trying to knock the 
stuffing out of them and scatter their remains to the wind. 
It is tempting to explain this grade of lethal verbal aggression as an 
expression of arrogance or boorishness. But there is more to it than that. Like 
the Bully, the Überbully attempts to demolish you through verbal 
harassment, not rational philosophical analysis - in clear violation of the 
canonical rules of philosophical discourse. All we need to do is ask why either 
brand of bully feels the need to resort to these thuggish tactics when the 
canonical ones are available, in order to understand their brutal performances 
as an exhibition of felt philosophical inadequacy that expresses fear of 
professional humiliation. The frequency with which shame and fear emerge 
in these forms measures the suitability of the practice of philosophy to stand 
as a testimonial to our achievement of the Socratic/Hampshirean "moral 
virtue of high civilization," thereby as a testimonial to the victory of "slave 
morality," and thereby as a testimonial to the centrality of reason in the 
structure of the self. 
There is also the philosophical style we may describe as the Bull. This one 
works best on students, or on colleagues who work in a different subspecialty 
than oneself. Like the Bulldozer and the Bullies, the Bull is designed to 
discourage questioning or dialogue, and silence dissent. The Bull may spew 
forth, with a great and rapid show of bombast, a torrent of technical or 
esoteric terminology, or inflated five-syllable abstractions. Or she may issue - 
again with no apology and much pomp - several incoherent, inconsistent, or 
mutually irrelevant assertions, and appear surprised at any suggestion of 
paradox. Or she may answer your pointed questions with a barrage of vague 
philosophical generalities that seem not to engage the issues at all. And the 
Bull may borrow some tactics from the Bully, in suggesting that any failure to 
grasp the overarching point of these turgid non sequiturs is merely a 
distressing symptom of your own philosophical incompetence. In this way 
the Bull uses the specialized tools of her trade to exclude you from 
participation in the private club to which she lets you know she belongs. The 
not-so-subtle message the Bull intends to communicate is: No Trespassers. 
Unlike the Bull's other philosophical utterances, this one is clear, easily 
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grasped, and usually elicits compliance. It is not easy to remain involved in a 
discussion in which the suspicion quickly grows that one's discussant is 
talking nonsense. 
And finally there is the Bullfinch, who simply flies away home. The 
Bullfinch avoids philosophical dialogue altogether, by declining to subject his 
views to philosophical scrutiny. Convinced of their veracity yet concerned to 
preserve their inviolability, the Bullfinch withdraws from philosophical 
engagement with unconverted others. Rather than argue his views, the 
Bullfinch at most will explain where he stands, ignoring retorts, criticisms, or 
opposing views by refusing to acknowledge their philosophical worth. The 
Bullfinch is more likely to view his own beliefs as so self-evidently true that it 
is beneath him to have to articulate or expose them to unconverted others in 
any form; and his opponent's beliefs as dangerous enough to justify getting 
rid of her at any cost. Thus the Bullfinch defends the sanctity of his 
convictions by refusing to defend them at all, instead retreating into silence, 
backhanded Machiavellian maneuvers, or flight. Or he may resort to cruder 
tools of psychological intimidation - of the sort Keynes describes - as more 
appropriate to his opponent. By refusing to engage in rational dialogue even 
as a weapon of intimidation, the Bullfinch thus approaches most nearly the 
explicit conduct of Nietzsche's Übermensch, for whom displays of power 
completely replace the Socratic ideal of rationality, and so express most 
clearly his unqualified contempt for his philosophical opponents. 
 
Philosophy, Power, and Historical Circumstance 
These brief character sketches do not exhaust the styles and strategies of 
intimidating philosophical practice, and there are more lethal ones than these: 
to treat philosophical contributions from others as though they had not been 
made; or as though they had been made by someone of higher professional 
status; or as autobiographical rather than philosophical in import; or as 
symptoms of mental illness; as well as the more subtle variants Keynes 
describes. The common motive that underlies all of these styles of dialogue is 
a desire to establish and maintain hierarchical übermenschlichen superiority, by 
silencing philosophical exchange rather than inviting it. This motive is not 
entirely foreign to any of us. But it is meant to stifle the exercise of rationality. 
As such, it is, in effect, an effort to obliterate the point and practice of 
philosophical dialogue altogether. It is worth asking what it is about the 
practice or profession of philosophy in general that kindles such an impulse 
to obliterate it; and how it is that this impulse can co-exist within the same 
field of inquiry as Hampshire's Socratic ideal. For this impulse does not signal 
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merely our moral and intellectual inadequacy to the ideal. It expresses the 
lethal and ultimately suicidal desire to eradicate it. 
We have certain external procedural devices for cloaking this suicidal 
impulse. There is the authoritarian device, of supplying spoken discussion 
with a strong-willed moderator; and the democratic device, of scrupulously 
invoking Robert's Rules of Order to govern every verbal contribution; and the 
juridical, testimony-cross-rebuttal-jury deliberation device, of the standard 
colloquium format. But if we were as civilized as Hampshire's description 
supposes, we would not need any of these external devices. We would not 
need a moderator to end filibusters or umpire foul balls because no one 
would be tempted to hog the allotted time or hit below the belt. We would not 
need Robert's Rules of Order because no one would be tempted to disrupt or 
exploit it. And we would not need the standard colloquium format because 
that format formalizes a dialectical procedure to which we would adhere 
naturally and spontaneously, as do Aristotle's temperate men to the mean and 
Kant's perfectly rational beings to the moral law. These devices are muzzles 
and restraining leashes designed to rein us in, not merely from expressing our 
philosophical enthusiasms too vehemently or at excessive length; but rather 
from too obviously lunging for the jugular under the guise of philosophical 
critique.
8
 Sometimes it is as though in our serious philosophical activity we 
needed to be monitored and cued from the wings by an instructor in the 
basics of philosophical etiquette. It is as though there were no internalized 
voice of intellectual conscience to guide our philosophical behavior at all. 
How is this lack of philosophical self-discipline to be understood? How 
are we to understand the frequent identification of personal and professional 
well-being with having at least temporarily obliterated one's philosophical 
enemies, and of personal and professional failure with having lost the war? 
And how are we to understand our own self-deception and lack of insight 
into the egoistic motives and meaning of such philosophical behavior - as 
though a punishing philosophical workover that verbally dices one's 
opponent into bite-size chunks were cognitively indistinguishable from the 
"cultivated caution and modesty in assertion" that Hampshire rightly 
applauds? Should we say that if we are incapable of practicing rational self-
restraint and self-scrutiny in the circumscribed and rarified arena of 
philosophical dialogue, there is small hope for doing so in more complex 
fields of social interaction? Or should we say, rather, that it is because the 
philosophical arena is so small and morally insignificant that we have 
devoted so little attention to habituating ourselves to proceed in a temperate 
                                                 
8
 So much for Hampshire's injunctions against metaphor. 
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and civilized manner; and that our übermenschlichen barbarity here has no 
practical implications for our rational moral potential elsewhere? 
The latter response is inadequate on several counts. First, the concept of 
rational philosophical dialogue as establishing metaethical conditions for 
comprehensive normative theory is too central to the moral and political 
views of too many major philosophers - Rawls, Hare, Dworkin, Rorty, and 
Habermas among them - to be dismissed as morally insignificant. If we 
cannot even succeed in discussing, in a rational and civilized manner, what 
we ought to do, it is not likely that we will succeed in figuring out what we 
ought to do, much less actually doing it. Second, talk is cheap; talk is the easy 
part of moral rectitude. If we can ever hold our tongue, choose our words, 
and exert ourselves to understand another and communicate successfully 
with her when our self-interest is at stake, then we may cultivate the rational 
disposition to do those things. The question then becomes whether we are less 
inclined to cultivate it when it is our purely philosophical interests that are at 
stake; and what that might reveal about the ability of philosophy -  and so 
rationality - to give point and form to our lives. Certainly there are those for 
whom philosophy is merely an intellectual game. 
Third, philosophy as the rational discipline par excellence has fashioned its 
own identity through the centrality of its involvement in the most elemental 
and universal ideals of human life: ideals of the good, the true, and the 
beautiful; of equality, rationality, and grace. These are the ideals that inspire 
the young to study philosophy, and that often sustain our allegiance to it as 
we grow older. That the intellectual skills with which we pursue research into 
these ideals can be so easily perverted by the Bulldozer, the Bullies, the Bull, 
and the Bullfinch in the service of the bad, the false, and the ugly is no minor 
matter. How a profession self-defined by its rationality and its idealism can 
generate suicidally self-repressive and self-abasing styles of practice demands 
explanation. 
Earlier I suggested that part of the explanation is to be found in the 
economic conditions that have come to characterize the profession of 
academic philosophy since the late 1960s. These conditions have encouraged 
a possessive and authoritarian attitude toward philosophical ideas that is 
incompatible with the obligations of philosophical practice as Hampshire 
enumerates them. We have seen that these include a commitment to clarity, 
precision, and care in the development of an argument or view; and a 
methodological caution that eschews easy answers for the sake of a coherent 
thesis that is fully cognizant of significant objections and alternatives to the 
view being defended. But these obligations must compete with the mounting 
difficulty of finding long-term or permanent jobs in the field. 
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Up to the early 1960s philosophy was a small, homogeneous, 
economically secure academic enclave. As would befit a community of 
Übermenschen, Stevenson's emotivism vied with Ross's and Pritchard's 
intuitionism and Moore's non-naturalism as the metaethical views of choice. 
Kantian, rationality-based metaethical views were not in the competition. 
With Johnson's Great Society programs of the mid-1960s, philosophy began to 
open its doors to younger scholars showing the ethnic, gender, and class 
diversity that has always been representative of the population of the United 
States. But those programs in higher education funded this expanded 
academic population only briefly. Since then the resulting scarcity of jobs has 
become an increasingly serious problem for younger philosophers, 
newcomers and legatees alike. It has been a central professional fact of life 
since the late 1970s. Those of us who entered the professional side of the field 
as graduate students in the mid-1970s had studied, benefited from, and taken 
as models philosophical writings that uniformly predated this dearth of 
professional opportunities. But we had also received a letter from the 
American Philosophical Association, routinely sent to all aspiring graduate 
students, advising us that very few jobs were likely to be available upon 
receipt of the Ph.D. Under these circumstances, such aspiring graduate 
students have had three choices: (1) ignore the letter; (2) ignore those aspects 
of their previous philosophical training that conflict with it; or (3) try to adapt 
in ways that will allow them to compete successfully in the field. Clearly, the 
student who is both rationally self-interested and committed to philosophy 
will choose (3), and most who have survived professionally have done so. 
For the most part the results have not been auspicious for the health of 
the field. The methodological caution that is essential to doing good 
philosophical work has been too often supplanted by an intellectual and 
philosophical timidity that is the antithesis of it. Understandably concerned to 
ensure their ability to continue and succeed professionally in the discipline to 
which they are committed, many younger philosophers in the past few 
decades have grown increasingly reluctant to fulfill the demands of the 
Oedipal drama that is essential to the flourishing of any intellectual 
discipline. In order to break new ground, younger thinkers must strive to 
study, absorb, elaborate, and then criticize and improve upon or replace the 
authoritative teachings on which their training is based. Otherwise they fail to 
achieve the critical independence and psychological and intellectual maturity 
that enable them to introduce new, stronger, and more comprehensively 
authoritative paradigms in their turn. Strawson's early critique of Russell's 
theory of descriptions, for example, or Rawls's rejection and displacement, as 
a young man in his early thirties, of Moore's philosophy of language-based 
metaethics, or Kripke's and Barcan Marcus's early repudiation of Quine's 
constraints on quantificational logic, or Kuhn's displacement of Popper's 
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philosophy of science in the early 1960s, are only a few of the available 
contemporary models for playing out this drama in philosophy. 
The obligations of philosophical practice as Epictetus and Hampshire 
enumerate them - and as Socrates exemplifies them - create an ideal context in 
which all of the characters in this drama can thrive. In attending only to the 
quality of philosophical contributions and not to the hierarchical position of 
those who make them, the "style of philosophical talking" Hampshire 
describes calls forth the best philosophical efforts of all parties, regardless of 
rank or stature. Careful, patient, and rational philosophical discussion is the 
great equalizer among discussants, the great leveler of professional 
hierarchy.
9
 So younger philosophers can feel secure in the conviction that in 
subjecting the views of their elders to searching scrutiny and possible 
refutation, they are only doing what the obligations of philosophical practice 
demand. 
This ideal of equality in rational dialogue comes into direct conflict with 
a reality in which professional survival is a scarce commodity doled out as 
reward in a zero-sum game. Where philosophical error translates as 
professional failure, the avoidance of professional failure requires the 
concealment of philosophical error at all costs. Under these circumstances 
there can be little place for the rational criticism and analysis of views, and so 
little place for unconstrained give-and-take among rational equals. These 
practices must be replaced by a system of patronage of the unempowered by 
the empowered, and mutual aggrandizement of the empowered by one 
another. It is because rational philosophical dialogue recognizes no 
professional hierarchy that other, extra-philosophical or even anti-
philosophical measures must be invoked to maintain it under circumstances 
in which hierarchical status is the surest index of professional survival. 
Philosophy as an academic discipline is correspondingly unusual in the 
obsessiveness and rigidity with which the character and composition of its 
traditional professional hierarchy has been guarded since the 1970s. In this 
traditional hierarchy, criticism from peers is received as an honor, whereas 
criticism from subordinates is resisted as insubordination; and novices, 
                                                 
9
 Indeed, there are few other fields in which the intellectual activity that centrally 
defines the discipline is so thoroughly inimical to professional hierarchy. Even in the 
natural sciences, such a hierarchy is justified to some extent by the training, experience, 
and accumulation of information and methodological resources required in order to 
ascend to its pinnacle. Only in philosophy (and perhaps mathematics) is it possible for 
some unschooled pipsqueak upstart to initiate a revolution in the field with an offhand, 
"Here's a thought!" issued from the safe haven of the armchair. Kripke's early work in 
modal logic would be an example; Parfit's on personal identity would be another. 
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newcomers, provisional members, and interlopers tend to rank among the 
lowest subordinates of all. Accordingly, the more they diverge - in thought, 
appearance or pedigree - from the tradition, the closer to the bottom of the 
hierarchy they are likely to be found, and the more blatant the exercises of 
power that keep them there. Correspondingly more attention has been given 
to Kantian, rationality-based metaethical views since the 1970s, and many 
newcomers, provisional members, and interlopers - including particularly 
large numbers of women - are to be found among their proponents. 
Younger thinkers who choose to diverge or defect rather than conform 
philosophically embark on a dangerous Oedipal drama in which they must 
confront and face down the wrath and resistance of their elders in order to 
prevail. By finally rejecting the views of those whom they have studied and 
by whom they may have been mentored and protected in the beginning 
stages of their career, younger scholars will often provoke disapproval, 
rejection or punitive professional retaliation from those who feel betrayed by 
their defection. They may risk their professional survival, advancement, and 
the powerful professional networks which the authoritative support of their 
mentors has supplied. This is of course an exceedingly painful and 
intimidating prospect for all concerned, elders and prodigal sons
10
 alike. It is 
nevertheless necessary in order to advance the dialogue and ensure the 
intellectual health of the discipline. 
The elders will survive this defection with their stature intact, as did 
Russell, Moore, Quine, and Popper; and eventually come to recognize their 
own example in that of their defectors. After all, they, too, were once 
defectors, and took the terrible risks they now discourage their own disciples 
from taking. Thus, those disciples need to demonstrate their respect for their 
elders, and the depth of their influence as role models, by similarly having the 
attachment and commitment to their own ideas, the energy and courage to 
probe their deepest implications, and a confidence in their value firm enough 
to impel them to this confrontation, despite the clear dangers to their 
professional self-interest. Otherwise these ideas become little more than 
disposable vehicles for promoting professional self-interest, of questionable 
value in themselves. 
One might argue that this brand of naive intellectual bravado is in 
mercifully short supply under the best and most professionally secure of 
                                                 
10
 I use this expression advisedly, since those who survive the confrontation are 
overwhelmingly male. The field numbers approximately 15,000 members. At last 
count, women occupied 8 percent, and African-American women 0.001 percent, of all 
tenured positions. The punishments inflicted for their philosophical insubordination 
are correspondingly more virulent. 
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circumstances. But nerve fails all the more quickly as the threat of 
professional extinction becomes more real; and this failure of intellectual 
nerve has by now so completely pervaded the field of philosophy that it has 
generated its own set of professional conventions: a virtual culture of 
genuflection, relative to which merely to embark on the confrontation with 
one's elders is a serious and sometimes fatal breach of etiquette. So, for 
example, when I was a junior faculty member, a very senior and very eminent 
colleague reprimanded my efforts to defend the position developed in this 
project by informing me that it was "not [my] place to have views"; I once had 
a paper accepted for publication on the sole condition that I excise my critique 
of a major figure in the field; and had one rejected because a single negative 
referee's report, although acknowledged by the editor to be incoherent and 
self-contradictory, came from an important personage. Rather than take on 
the major thinkers, many have been encouraged or coerced to avoid the 
Oedipal confrontation altogether. The great, ongoing contentious debates that 
extended from Plato through Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and on to the 
Vienna Circle, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Habermas seem to have been all but 
silenced by the repressive dictates of professionalism. 
These genuflective norms of etiquette undergird the recommendations of 
professional self-interest, by encouraging and rewarding excessive deference 
to philosophical authority, by discouraging forthright argumentation and 
critique, and by undermining the intellectual and professional confidence of 
younger philosophers in their ability to develop their own views 
independently and survive confrontation with their elders. They thereby 
infantilize the unempowered, by stripping them of the very resources most 
essential, in the long term, to their own survival and flourishing: the character 
dispositions of rationality. It then would be unsurprising to discover that, 
when the unempowered were rewarded for their obedience with professional 
empowerment, the character dispositions of rationality were given both less 
exercise and less philosophical weight. 
These norms of genuflection, necessitated by economic imperatives, 
create the authoritarian conditions under which the Bulldozer, the Bullies, the 
Bull, and the Bullfinch flourish. Like other artifacts of the culture of 
genuflection, they function to protect canonical or insecure philosophical 
territory using anti-philosophical weaponry, when pure philosophical 
dialogue itself is too subversive of established hierarchy or received 
interpretation to be tolerated. And through practice, repetition, and 
professional reward, these repressive philosophical styles are transmitted as 
role models from one generation of graduate students to the next, as 
legitimate modes of philosophical discourse. Ultimately they supplant the 
legitimate and civilized modes of philosophical discourse Hampshire 
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describes with self-aggrandizing displays of power and domination, and 
corrupt the quality of philosophical ideas accordingly. In replacing the 
obligations of philosophical practice with the imperatives of professional 
survival, these styles bespeak more than our egoism. They bespeak our 
inability to transcend structural conflicts between the democratic 
prerequisites of a genuine philosophical meritocracy and the consequences of 
a market economy. 
 
Philosophy as Exemplar of Rationality 
Western philosophy has always found its source of value in its 
identification with rationality, originally the systematic rational inquiry 
practiced by Socrates. But as other disciplines - the natural sciences, 
psychology, sociology, political theory, anthropology - have gradually 
seceded from the formal discipline of philosophy and formulated their own 
rational methodologies, philosophy has repeatedly sought outside itself for its 
defining exemplar of rationality, and so for its source of intrinsic value. Up 
through the nineteenth century, Anglo-American analytic philosophy ignored 
the defection of the natural and social sciences and identified rationality with 
empirical rational inquiry, i.e., with scientific methodology. Traditional 
epistemology began to be upstaged by the newly emerging subspecialty of 
philosophy of science. At the beginning of this century, the melding of logic 
and mathematics of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica provided 
philosophy with another exemplar of rationality with which to identify: one 
of logical rigor, symbol, and system. Traditional speculative metaphysics 
received a corresponding boost in status at the same time that it took a 
drubbing from Logical Positivism. After the Second World War, philosophy 
turned to Frege, Wittgenstein, and Chomsky for yet another exemplar of 
rational philosophical method as linguistic analysis. Linguistic anthropology 
and sociology received correspondingly more attention from philosophers of 
language. And since the 1970s, philosophy has increasingly turned back to 
the sciences - this time to the emerging field of cognitive science - for its 
exemplar of rational methodology. The philosophy of mind and theory of 
action have flourished accordingly. Trade relations have thus run in both 
directions: the discipline of philosophy has exported and diversified its early 
conception of rationality as systematic Socratic inquiry into newly emerging 
research disciplines; and these, in turn, import back into the discipline of 
philosophy more highly specialized conceptions of their own. 
The more the discipline of philosophy has succumbed to the political, 
economic, and professional pressures just described, the more stridently it has 
insisted upon these externally imported exemplars sometimes singly, 
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sometimes in tandem - as centrally definitive of the field and the practice of 
philosophy. And the more the discipline of philosophy as the practice of 
rationality par excellence has been threatened from any and all directions, and 
the more the specialized conceptions of rational methodology have 
proliferated, the more tenaciously philosophy has held onto its self-
identification with rationality as such, adjusting its source of value according 
to how in particular rationality is conceived. 
In the end, however, it is only philosophy's original identification with 
the systematic rational inquiry of Socrates - Epictetus' injunction to 
transgress in nothing the clear pronouncement of reason… to live as one 
who is mature and proficient, and let all that seems best to you be a law 
that you cannot transgress… [to] attend to nothing but reason in all that 
[you] encounte[r]… to live as one who would wish to be a Socrates.
11
 
that remains impervious to defection, attack, or nonrational alternatives. It is 
impervious to defection because emerging fields that have defected have 
taken rational Socratic inquiry with them as their minimal foundations. It is 
impervious to attack because any such attack must presuppose its methods in 
order to be rationally intelligible. And it is impervious to nonrational 
alternatives because no such alternative competes with it on its own ground. 
Philosophy's greatest challenge, then, is to live up to its traditional, Socratic 
self-conception: conduct in all spheres that gives centrality to the character 
dispositions of rationality. 
Under the historical circumstances earlier described, it is impossible to 
avoid calling into question the present-day adequacy of philosophy to meet 
this challenge, and so, its right to insist on its self-definition as an exemplar of 
rationality. Hence it is impossible to avoid questioning whether the character 
dispositions of rationality can be as central to the structure of the self as they 
seemed to be for Socrates and Epictetus. The problem would seem to be not 
that we so often violate Epictetus' injunction to "transgress in nothing the 
clear pronouncement of reason," but rather that we so often transgress that 
clear pronouncement in precisely those areas of conduct in which reason is 
purported to reign supreme. One explanation would be that philosophers 
have been guilty of self-serving pretensions to rationality all along; and that 
philosophical practice has never consisted of anything more than 
psychological intimidation and the flouting of power imbalances under the 
guise of rational dialogue. According to this view, Epictetus' entreaties would 
be addressed precisely to those in need of rationality as an inspiring ideal by 
which to modulate largely nonrational behavior. 
                                                 
11
 Epictetus, Enchiridion LI, footnote 1. 
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But another possibility is that we must rather take special care now, in 
this particular historical and cultural epoch, to defend the centrality to 
philosophy of those character dispositions of rationality the exercise of which 
have been so traditionally definitive of its practice. It might be that these 
dispositions, and so the traditional practice of philosophy itself - and so its 
adequacy as an exemplar of rationality - are now under particularly severe 
attack, from both inside and outside the discipline, by concerted attempts to 
defend traditional power relations against the destabilizing effects of rational 
Socratic interrogation. The displacement of rationality from a central 
functional and valuational role in the way the structure of the self is 
conceived signals a move away from the "slave morality" that valorizes the 
character dispositions of rationality as essentially constitutive of human 
survival and flourishing. This displacement also signals a move toward 
alternative, übermenschlichen norms of behavior that implicitly condone freer 
and more blatant exercises of power in the service of desire, instinct, and 
emotion. It is no accident that this Gestalt shift occurs at an historical juncture 
when such exercises and displays of power are increasingly necessary to 
defend conventional social arrangements - both inside and outside the 
academy - against rational Socratic interrogation by individuals and 
communities traditionally disempowered by them. But it is then doubly 
ironical that the character dispositions of rationality themselves should be 
marshalled by some philosophers to justify them. 
The philosophical use of reason to justify unreason then obliges those 
philosophers who explicitly value reason, rational interrogation, and the 
character dispositions of rationality more generally, as intrinsic goods, to 
defend them in turn. It requires us to reaffirm and protect these intrinsic 
goods as essential and definitive of philosophical practice, regardless of the 
express philosophical views on which they are honed. It requires us as well to 
realize these values in our philosophical practice, regardless of the 
professional repercussions. And it requires us to disregard those 
repercussions as secondary to the preservation of rational integrity. That is, 
the philosophical task is to demonstrate the deeply entrenched necessity of 
rationality to coherent thought and action, independently of the express 
metaethical views or valuation of rationality any particular philosopher might 
hold. That is my task in this project. 
 
The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 
In ethics, we distinguish between a normative and a metaethical theory. A 
normative moral theory tells us what we ought to do, and why. Thus it 
traditionally utilizes such prescriptive terms as "ought," "should," "good," 
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"right," "valuable," or "desirable" (I offer an analysis of such terms in Volume 
II, A Kantian Conception). This is the practical part of a normative theory, also 
known as casuistry. Such a theory also contains a value-theoretic component 
that enlists certain states, conditions, or events that explain what is good, 
right, or desirable: friendship, for example; or love, or reason, or integrity. 
Value theories differ with respect to both content and structure (I say more 
about these distinctions in Volume I, chapter I). 
By contrast, a metaethical theory seeks to unpack the metaphysical 
presuppositions of a normative theory: to what sorts of entities, if any, its 
prescriptive terms refer; whether it can be objectively true or not; what its 
scope of application might be; what conception of the agent, rationality, or 
human psychology it presupposes. Thus a metaethical theory is descriptive 
and analytical where a normative one is prescriptive and hortatory. 
By comparison with the putative centrality of rationality to the practice of 
philosophy itself, the metaethical views philosophers expressly defend show 
wide variation in the role each assigns to rationality in the structure of the 
self. Here the value and function of reason ranges from the central to the 
peripheral, and the prominence of nonrational elements in the structure of the 
self varies accordingly. At one extreme, consider Subjectivism. Subjectivism 
essentially rejects truth and objectivity as possible goals for intellectual 
discourse on any subject. But any judgment in the categorical indicative mood 
implies - whether rightly or wrongly - the truth and objectivity of the 
judgment, including the judgment that truth and objectivity are impossible. 
So if that judgment, that truth and objectivity are impossible, is itself true and 
objectively valid, then it is false and objectively invalid. If it is false, then its 
negation, i.e., that truth and objectivity are not impossible, is true. So the truth 
of subjectivism implies its falsity. If, on the other hand, Subjectivism is neither 
true nor false, then it refers to nothing and expresses at best the speaker's 
emotional despair about the possibility of communication - a condition 
treated better in psychotherapy than in intellectual discourse. If this paradox 
of judgment strikes you as in any way troubling, or as detracting from the 
intelligibility of Subjectivism, then you have already accepted intellectual 
criteria of rational consistency that imply an aspiration to objective validity 
and truth. Only when these criteria are presupposed can meaningful or 
coherent discussion, on any topic whatsoever, proceed. 
A fortiori, any judgment of specifically moral value aspires to be more 
than a mere emotive expression of the speaker's momentary feelings. It 
aspires to objective validity, and we signal this by stating our views publicly, 
defending them with evidence or reasoning, and subjecting them to critical 
analysis in light of standards of rationality and truth we implicitly accept. So, 
for example, suppose someone walks up to you and punches you in the nose. 
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Your verbal reaction will surely include the statements that he had no right to 
do that, that his behavior was unwarranted and inappropriate, and that you 
did nothing to deserve it. It is not likely that you will then go on to add that of 
course these are just your opinions which have no objective validity and that 
there is no final truth of the matter. Rather, you express your beliefs in 
categorical indicative judgments, which you of course presume to be true, and 
which you can defend by appeal to facts you take to be obvious and values 
you take to be equally obvious. Of course, some of your presumptive 
judgments may be mistaken or false. But this does not entail that there is no 
fact of the matter as to whether they are or not. 
The project of moral communication has not only to do with letting 
others know what we think, but also trying to command their 
acknowledgment that we are right. Those of us committed to the Socratic 
ideal prefer to command this acknowledgment through rational dialogue 
rather than emotional rhetoric, dissimulation, psychological manipulation, or 
threats of professional or social rewards withheld or punishments inflicted for 
dissenting. That is, we do our best to "live as one who would wish to be 
Socrates," rather than as a Bulldozer, Bully, Überbully, Bull, or Bullfinch. By 
relying on the force of rational dialogue to win agreement with our moral 
convictions, we try to command not only others' assent, but also their 
intellectual respect. In rational discussion, analysis, and argument, we reach 
beyond the circle of the converted to try and convert the unconvinced. We 
express respect for the rationality of the unconverted by appealing to it, rather 
than to their emotional, psychological, or social vulnerabilities, to convince 
them. And we receive the best confirmation of the truth of our moral 
convictions when others are rationally convinced, rather than manipulated or 
coerced or deceived, into adopting them. Call this the enterprise of Socratic 
metaethics. Socratic metaethics grounds moral convictions and judgments in 
the Socratic ideal of rational dialogue as a means for arriving at moral truth. 
Within the enterprise of Socratic metaethics, there are many ways to 
proceed. One that has a long historical pedigree is what I will call 
Antirationalism.
12
 In earlier historical periods this approach has emerged 
variously in normative theories such as Intuitionism or the Moral Sense 
Theory of the British Moralists. (Similarly, Virtue Theory claims allegiance to 
Aristotle, but on extremely shaky exegetical grounds.) As developed in the 
philosophy of Sir David Ross, Intuitionism stipulates the existence of an 
innate faculty of moral intuition, consultation of which tells us what moral 
                                                 
12
 This is Thomas Nagel's term to characterize variants on the same group of views as I 
discuss here. See his The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
p. 8. Chapter III of Volume I is devoted to a study of this work. 
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principles we ought to follow in action.
13
 More recent Antirationalists such as 
Annette Baier, Lawrence Blum, Michael Stocker, or Susan Wolf hark back to 
British Moral Sense Theorists such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, or the Hume of 
Book III of the Treatise, by repudiating the governing role of moral principle 
and instead appealing to moral emotion or sentiment to guide action.
14
 
(Similarly, the Noncognitivism of Gibbard, Raz, and Anderson reject the 
rationality of moral principle, but then resurrect rationality as a prescriptive 
criterion for moral emotions and attitudes.) In all cases, moral guidance is 
given by a nonrational component of the self: we ought to perform those 
actions we intuitively know to be right, or, respectively, feel most deeply. No 
consistent Antirationalist normative view can have a developed practical or 
casuistical component, because what any particular individual ought to do 
depends on her particular intuitions, feelings, or desires - not on impartially 
conceived principles. Nevertheless, the value-theoretic parts of these views 
are articulated and developed within the impartial normative constraints of 
Socratic metaethics. 
The following discussion will contain much on the failings of 
Antirationalism. Here I call attention to just one reason why it is unpalatable 
in practice to anyone seriously interested in the enterprise of Socratic 
metaethics as a distinctive philosophical methodology. This is that it appeals 
to the authority of a first-personal, inaccessible experience in judging, not 
only what one should do, but what should be done simpliciter under particular 
circumstances. In consulting only one's moral emotions or intuitions about 
how to interpersonally resolve some hypothetical or actual moral problem 
that bears no obvious relation to one's own circumstances, one presumes to 
legislate how others should behave or feel on the basis of a moral foundation 
which is cognitively inaccessible to them, and therefore inaccessible to their 
evaluation. 
Suppose, for example, that I discover that my best friend is dealing drugs 
to minors and decide, on the basis of my feelings about him, to protect our 
friendship rather than betray it by turning him in to the police. There is a 
great deal you and I may discuss about such a case. But without knowing, 
                                                 
13
 Sir David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). 
14
 Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); 
Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980); Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79/8 (1982); First Earl of 
Shaftesbury, "Selections" in The British Moralists: 1650-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1969); Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations of the Moral Sense (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press); Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. SelbyBigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), Book III. 
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and without being able to experience directly the particular nature and 
quality of my feelings for this person, you may find my behavior simply 
indefensible. You may acknowledge and sympathize with the deep bonds of 
friendship and loyalty I am feeling, but find it nevertheless impossible to 
condone my claim that I just could not bring myself to destroy them by 
turning him in. You may think that no friendship, no matter how deep or 
meaningful, should count for so much that it outweighs the right of minors to 
be shielded from drug addiction before they are mature enough to make a 
rational choice. And since I cannot convey to you the direct quality of the 
experience of my friend on which my feelings are based, there is little I can 
say to defend my decision. Perhaps I may expect your pity or sympathy for 
my dilemma, but I cannot expect your respect or agreement. So unless you 
find me particularly compelling as a role model on nonrational grounds (say, 
my crucial presence in your upbringing; or my charisma, or broad sphere of 
social or professional influence; or your desire to stay in my good graces), I 
can provide you with no reason why the principles on which I acted (and 
even Antirationalists act on principles, even if they don't think about or 
formulate them) should govern your behavior under similar circumstances. 
This is not a peculiarly Kantian objection. Unless a principle on which I 
act is formulated partially, i.e., with indexical operators, proper names and 
definite descriptions, we presume it to apply impartially; that is the way 
language works. Terms and principles have general application to the scope 
of referents they denote, unless their scopes are restricted explicitly by 
stipulation or fiat or context. So, for example, if I tell you that dogs are 
susceptible to gastric tortion, I am either mistaken or else using the term "dog" 
in an idiosyncratically restricted sense, to refer specifically to large dogs with 
cylindrical stomachs. Similarly, if I tell you I feel that friendship should come 
before social welfare, you will naturally take me to be doing more than 
merely emoting my personal feelings about this particular friend. You will 
naturally take me to be expressing a judgment that applies not only to my 
own behavior in this case, but to anyone's who must weigh the relative 
priority of friendship and social welfare. But since I am merely telling you 
what I feel, and since what I feel is not directly available to you, I offer you no 
available justificatory basis for evaluating the applicability of this principle to 
your behavior. Unless you have some special reason to be impressed with my 
feelings, you have no reason to be impressed with the principles on which I 
act. Antirationalism, then, subverts in practice the enterprise of Socratic 
metaethics on which it relies, by appealing to interpersonally inaccessible 
moral states to justify its moral judgments. 
Ross's Intuitionism was couched in a metaethics that attempted to avoid 
this outcome, and contemporary Antirationalism may adopt a similar 
strategy. Ross argued that the principles we morally intuit as the outcome of 
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careful and considered reflection on the circumstances in question were 
objectively valid, in the same way that mathematical intuitionists argue that 
the objects of mathematical intuition, such as the basic truths of arithmetic, are 
objectively valid. But this makes intuition, as well as its objects, even more 
cryptic and cognitively inaccessible than before. What if we have different 
moral intuitions about the same case? What if yours puts social welfare ahead 
of friendship? How do we determine which one of us is morally defective, 
and in what respect? The difficulty Intuitionists face in claiming an objectively 
valid status for the moral judgments they make is that intersubjective 
agreement can provide the only evidence for the mysterious mental capacities 
required to make them; and this, of course, makes the enterprise of Socratic 
metaethics itself unnecessary. Where rational dialogue becomes necessary to 
addressing the unconverted that lie outside one's circle of sympathizers, 
Intuitionism has nothing to say. 
Contemporary Antirationalists might adopt a similar strategy, by 
claiming a certain veracity for moral emotions, based on their authenticity as 
a forthright expression of a person's most centrally defining values and 
projects. This would resolve Antirationalism into a species of Subjectivism: if 
a certain judgment authentically expresses my centrally defining values and 
projects, it is true, at least for me. I do not think this is an interesting use of the 
term "true," and will not pause to rehearse any more of the elementary 
objections to Subjectivism. Suffice it to raise the obvious problem, analogous 
to that faced by the Intuitionist, of how to dispose of the authentic feelings 
and judgments of the unconverted; or of a stormtrooper or lynch mob. 
Otherwise the basic objection stands: Antirationalism appeals for its 
persuasive power on interpersonally inaccessible moral states, and thereby 
sabotages the enterprise of Socratic metaethics on which it relies. 
By contrast, Rationalism takes the enterprise of Socratic metaethics 
seriously as a methodological presupposition of all metaethics. The method of 
Rationalism is to try to justify a moral theory or principle by appeal to reason 
and argument as the currency of interpersonal communication. A Rationalist 
seeks to lead her reader or listener from weak and mutually acceptable 
premises to a substantive conclusion as to the most convincing substantive 
moral theory or principle, by way of argument, analysis, critique, and 
example interpersonally accessible to both. A Rationalist may appeal to 
imagination, personal experience, or certain feelings or perceptions or 
intuitions as reasons for or against a particular view; but she views reason - 
not the feelings or perceptions or intuitions or other responses invoked as 
reasons - as the final arbiter of rational dialogue. 
In this undertaking, Rationalism is neither broadly democratic nor 
narrowly fascistic. A Rationalist does not try to gain adherents for her view 
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by oversimplifying the theory or the arguments, or by obfuscating them with 
neologisms or inflated prose or grim silence in order to intimidate others into 
accepting it. In appealing to reason, Rationalism addresses itself only to those 
who are willing to exercise theirs. It does, however, assume that all competent 
adults can do so, regardless of culture or environment. In this, it is more 
democratic than Antirationalism, which demands intersubjective concurrence 
in substantive moral judgment as the only convincing evidence of the truth of 
those judgments, when in fact there is no necessary connection between 
intersubjective concurrence and truth at all. For these among other reasons, 
Rationalism defines the critical perspective adopted in this project. The 
argument proceeds by appeal to reasons and critical analysis, and most of the 
philosophers discussed here proceed similarly in defending their views - 
regardless of the substantive content of those views. 
 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self 
The main focus of discussion in both volumes of this project is with two 
competing branches of Rationalism that differ with respect to the role each 
assigns to rationality in the structure of the self. Both branches agree upon the 
Socratic metaethical enterprise as a philosophical methodology. Both agree, as 
well, on the necessity of providing a metaethical conception of the subject as 
agent, as a foundation for making normative claims about what subjects as 
agents should do. And both agree upon the necessity of explaining what they 
think moves subjects as agents to act, and in what they think acting rationally 
consists. But each branch deploys different models of human motivation and 
rationality as the shared, weak metaethical premises on the basis of which to 
argue for these normative moral claims. The first branch is what I will call the 
Humean conception of the self, the second the Kantian. Thus both Humean and 
Kantian conceptions in fact count as varieties of Rationalism according to this 
taxonomy, regardless of the Antirationalist content some Humean views may 
have. 
By a "conception of the self," I mean an explanatory theoretical model of 
the self that describes its dynamics and structure. A conception of the self is to 
be distinguished from a self-conception, which is the same as a "personal self-
image." The latter expresses the way or ways in which an individual thinks of 
himself, for example, as nice, well-intentioned, grumpy, loyal, fastidious, etc. 
It typically plays a normative role in individual psychology: we try to live up 
to the ideal individual we conceive ourselves to be, and regard negative 
attributes as flaws or deviations from that ideal. Thus a self-conception is part 
of one's normative moral theory. By contrast, a conception of the self plays a 
descriptive, metaethical role in moral theory: it identifies and describes the 
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kind of individual to whom the theory purports to apply. For example, a 
moral theory that urges general conformity to the Golden Rule on the 
grounds that it best enables each individual to promote her self-interest 
implicitly identifies those individuals to whom the theory is addressed as 
desiring to promote their self-interest. Similarly, a moral theory that 
recommends actions governed by the dictates of reason presupposes reason 
as a significant motivational factor in the relevant agents. 
Traditionally, moral philosophers who write systematically and 
discursively always begin by describing their conception of human subjects as 
agents before they tell you what they think those agents ought to do. That is, 
they preface their normative claims with a metaethical conception of the self 
to which those claims are intended to apply. If they did not, we would have 
no way of gauging whether or not we ourselves were intended subjects of the 
theory. A conception of the self, then, provides a metaethical account of the 
psychological facts about human agents considered as subjects of normative 
moral principles. 
My question in this project will not be that about which normative moral 
theory is uniquely correct. It will be the more foundational question of which 
metaethical conception of the self underlying normative moral theories 
provides the most accurate account of the psychological facts. If a moral 
theory's underlying conception of the self is fallacious or largely inaccurate 
regarding the psychology of human nature, the question of the theory's 
validity for human beings can scarcely arise. 
A conception of the self as I define it comprises two parts: first, it includes 
a motivational model. This explains what causes the self to act, and how. It 
identifies those events and states within the subject that constitute its capacity 
for agency; and it explains how, under certain specified conditions, those 
capacities are realized in agency. So, the motivational model in a conception 
of the self is an explanatory and causal model. Second, a conception of the self 
includes a structural model. This describes and charts the conditions of rational 
coherence and equilibrium within the self. It depicts that state of the self in 
which it functions as a unified psychological entity, and maintains 
psychological balance and integrity among its cognitive and conative 
components. Taken together, the structural and the motivational models 
explain what a unified subject is and how it is transformed into responsible 
agency. 
The Humean and the Kantian conceptions of the self are each grounded 
to some extent, although not entirely, in the writings of Hume and Kant 
respectively. The first is the prevailing conception: Humean premises 
concerning motivation and rationality are widely accepted in such disparate 
fields as psychology, economics, decision theory, political theory, sociology, 
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and, of course, philosophy. I believe that this conception is misguided in 
several respects, and in Volume I of this project I try to say why. The second 
branch of Rationalism in moral philosophy is less popular: Kantian premises 
regarding motivation and rationality are accepted in some areas of moral 
philosophy and social theory, but are not widely shared outside them. I 
believe that the full power of this conception of the self has not been 
sufficiently explored or exploited, and in Volume II I will try to begin to 
remedy this. 
Relative to the enterprise of Socratic metaethics, my fundamental 
objection to the Humean conception of the self, and consequent allegiance to 
the Kantian, can be summarized quite simply: by insisting on desire as the 
sole cause of human action, the Humean conception of the self diminishes our 
conception of ourselves as rational agents, by failing to recognize or respect 
the ability of rational analysis and dialogue, as described above, to influence 
our behavior, even as it deploys and depends on them in philosophical 
discourse. This immediately raises the question, unanswerable within the 
traditional framework of metaethics itself, of what Humean moral 
philosophers take themselves to be accomplishing by discursively and 
rationally elaborating their views in print. If rationality is incapable of 
changing minds or motivating action, as Humeans frequently claim, what is 
the point of rationally defending their views in books and articles? Or is the 
point merely to get tenure and attract disciples motivated similarly by 
careerist considerations to adopt and promulgate one's views? Whereas 
Antirationalism subverts the enterprise of Socratic metaethics in practice 
while relying on it in theory, the Humean conception of the self subverts 
Socratic metaethics in theory while relying on it in practice. 
We know from the historical examples mentioned earlier, as well as from 
personal experience, that the practice of normative moral philosophy often is 
not futile, its substantive views not motivationally impotent, and its practical 
consequences often far from inconsequential. The challenge is then to identify 
the metaethical conception of the self, rationality, and motivation that best 
explains its practical import. Are normative moral theories always adopted 
merely as a matter of convenience, in order to justify substantive policy 
decisions whose true raison d'être is the perpetuation of self-aggrandizing 
power relationships? Are they imported merely to legitimate pre-existing 
desires, sentiments, and political or social agendas, as the Humean conception 
implies? Or is it at least possible that they may themselves inspire and 
motivate the implementation of alternative agendas, disinterestedly and 
independently of the immediate self-interests and biases of their proponents? 
More concretely put: can reason itself inspire individuals other than Socrates 
to act and sacrifice in the service of rational social ideals? 
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Suppose it should transpire that the Humean conception of the self is, in 
fact, the most accurate explanatory model we can formulate. This would 
mean that, across nations as well as communities, subcultures, and 
individuals, human beings were not capable of marshalling the reserves of 
rationality to transcend the pursuit of self-interest, the gratification of desire, 
and the expression of instinct and emotion, in a shared vision of the good in 
the realization of which all can cooperate. Then all of our lives - not only 
those of the unempowered - would soon become even more nasty, brutish, 
and short than they have been in recent decades. It is here that Kant joins 
Hobbes in rejecting Nietzsche's Übermensch. A social order (however well 
serviced by Untertanen blinded by "slave morality") in which all fully 
empowered citizens were free to wield that power in the service of their 
instincts and desires would be no viable social order at all. 
And a fortiori: should it transpire that philosophers were not capable of 
marshalling the character dispositions of rationality, so well exemplified by 
Socrates and described by Epictetus and Hampshire, to transcend the pursuit 
of professional self-aggrandizement in a shared vision of rational 
philosophical practice in which all could participate as equals, our 
professional practice would diverge more and more completely from the 
Socratic ideal of philosophical activity that led most of us to it, and poison our 
commitment to that activity accordingly. A philosophical practice in which all 
fully empowered participants were free to exploit that power in the service of 
personal desires would be no Socratic enterprise at all. This is the 
consequence to which the veracity of the Humean conception of the self 
would lead. 
If, on the other hand, rational considerations can cause a change of mind 
or heart, then why should it not cause a change in behavior as well? A 
Kantian conception of the self acknowledges the motivational influence of 
rational argument on action from the outset. In speech and writing, Kantian 
moral philosophers exploit rationality unapologetically through appeals to 
conscience and reason, and reminders of who and what we are and where 
our responsibilities as rational agents lie. 
The Humean conception is engendered by, but is not identical to, Hume's 
own conception of the self. Nor is it clear that it is embraced in its entirety by 
any one of its adherents. Rather, different facets of it are pressed into service 
to do different philosophical jobs: to explain behavior, for example; or predict 
preferences; or to analyze moral motivation, or freedom of the will. Thus the 
picture I shall sketch is a composite one, drawn from many different sources. 
This conception has been refined and elaborated to a high degree of detail in 
decision theory and the philosophy of mind, and its theoretical simplicity and 
apparent explanatory potency is attractive. But it has resulted in simplistic 
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approaches to the understanding of human behavior in the social sciences, 
and it has generated enormous problems for moral philosophy. 
This, shortly put, is the first, critical part of the view I shall try to defend, 
in three lines of argument: critical, historical/exegetical, and substantive. In 
Volume I, I offer critical arguments that enumerate some of the major internal 
and functional defects of the prevailing Humean conception of the self, with 
an eye to later highlighting the superior comprehensiveness, explanatory 
force, and suitability for moral theory of its suggested rival. Thus Volume I 
essentially is devoted to complaining about other people. I also offer 
historical/exegetical arguments to demonstrate the limitations of Hume's own 
conception of rationality, and its imperviousness to face-saving charitable 
exegeses, in Chapters XI and XII. 
The second, substantive part of this project that comprises Volume II 
argues that after having devoted two and a half centuries of attention to the 
Humean paradigm, it is now time to move on to a sustained consideration of 
the historically more recent, alternative conception of the self Kant proposed 
in response to these problems (which he, unlike us, saw right away). I suggest 
that we continue more deliberately the glacial process of collaborative 
refinement and elaboration of this alternative conception already begun, not 
only in Kantian moral philosophy, but in certain branches of cognitive 
psychology and social theory as well. My efforts in this project differ from 
those of most contemporary Kantian moral philosophers, in that I assume that 
Kant's moral writings by themselves are insufficient for developing a 
foundational conception of the self for moral philosophy. I believe that such a 
conception must be grounded in the conception of the self Kant actually 
develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. I adumbrate that conception, and make 
the case for the untapped richness of Kant's own conception of rationality and 
its potential as a resource for contemporary metaethics, in the first chapter of 
Volume II. Elsewhere
15
 I offer a more extended treatment that explains in 
greater detail What Kant Really Meant. 
The historical/exegetical arguments of Chapters XI and XII in Volume I 
and Chapter I in Volume II situate both the Humean conception and its rival 
in their proper historical contexts. The critical arguments and the 
historical/exegetical arguments are intended to motivate us to rethink our 
commitment to the prevailing paradigm, first by pointing out defects in its 
present formulation, and second, by scrutinizing the extent to which we may 
validly appeal to the authority of history and tradition in support of that 
formulation, and in support of the proposed alternative. 
                                                 
15
 In Volume II, footnote 7. 
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I then put Kant's conception to work in a contemporary form in the 
remaining chapters of Volume II, in a concerted campaign for the "slave 
morality" candidate. I build on the conclusions of Chapter I to offer 
substantive metaethical arguments that articulate and develop the 
motivational and structural models of the self that I claim undergird not only 
the range of moral theories most appropriate to the psychological facts about 
human beings, but also, therefore, our factual assumptions about the 
explanation of human behavior. Here the main theses are that the formal 
requirements of rational coherence structure the self, are a necessary 
condition of unified agency, and impose formal constraints on the range of 
ends human agents can rationally adopt. 
Thus I claim that theoretical reason is motivationally effective in action, 
hence that the Humean model of motivation - the belief-desire model - is 
incomplete. I claim also that theoretical reason does imply substantive 
constraints on final ends that differentiate rational from irrational ones, hence 
that the Humean model of rationality - the expected utility-maximizing model 
- is incomplete. I argue that reason can therefore justify a certain range of 
normative moral theories as rational final ends, and can motivate us to adopt 
them. However, reason cannot show any one of these theories to be uniquely 
rational, nor that it is to be implied by the requirements of reason itself, as so 
many philosophers have thought. Rather, the appeal to reason, on which we 
as philosophers implicitly rely, presupposes a view of ourselves as socialized 
moral agents who are theoretically rational and therefore morally responsible. 
This conception of the self opposes not only the Humean dictum that 
rationality is impotent to determine the ends we seek. It also opposes the 
Antirationalist stance that treats rationality in action as an impediment to 
personal authenticity. It implies that the Kantian conception of the self 
explains our actual moral behavior, including our reflective philosophical 
behavior, better than the prevailing Humean alternative, and that therefore it 
provides a more realistic and appropriate justificatory foundation for moral 
theory. These substantive arguments are intended to present an alternative 
way of conceptualizing our own behavior and conscious life as better suited 
not only to our aims in moral philosophy, but to explanation of the 
psychological facts as well. 
I do not expect that any of these lines of argument will necessarily 
compel all, or perhaps even most, Humeans and Antirationalists to see the 
error of their ways or reform them accordingly. For in the end these 
arguments presuppose the value of rationality as the defining element in the 
structure of the self. They presuppose that one is prepared, not only to 
recognize rationality as definitive, but to valorize its character dispositions, as 
a "slave morality" does. As in any philosophical disagreement, philosophical 
The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics  35 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
opponents may ascribe to the same consideration cited as a reason a very 
different weight, and what is conclusive to one may be irrelevant to another, 
namely: 
 
The Kantian The Antirationalist The Humean 
But X is irrational! But X is irrational! But X is irrational! 
But Y is counterintuitive! But Y is counterintuitive! But Y is counterintuitive! 
But Z is unsatisfying! But Z is unsatisfying! But Z is 
unsatisfying! 
 
So even if I succeed in making a plausible case that reason has that centrality, 
I have still relied on and presupposed the value of the very capacity I mean in 
my argument to valorize. A real Antirationalist who disparages the value of 
rationality will therefore accord little value to my rational arguments that 
rationality has value. If my reader is a real Humean for whom rationality has 
value but no motivational efficacy, my arguments will then provide no 
motivation to rethink his values, no matter how persuasive they are. Perhaps 
only Hobbes's astute - and rationally persuasive - observations on the 
necessary transience and instability of accumulated power might lead him to 
reconsider the value of the Socratic ideal. 
 
Note 
This essay serves as the introduction in each volume of a two-volume work 
(nearing completion) entitled Rationality and the Structure of the Self, 
Volume I: The Humean Conception and Volume II: A Kantian Conception. A 
planned third volume, Kant's Metaethics, will appear separately. I am grateful 
to Professor Naomi Zack for her interest in the project's overview and 
motivation laid out in the following discussion. 
 
See the figure in the Appendix to this chapter for the author's schematic 
location of her project of Socratic metaethics. [Ed.] 
